According to the United Nations, “the collapse of state authority, erosion of basic services, marginalization and exclusion of youth and women and endemic poverty over several decades were significant contributing factors to Sierra Leone's decade of war” which lasted from1991 until 2002. Similar argument could be made of the Niger Delta -- especially in the oil-producing communities -- where, for several decades, there was an absence of government and an unconscionable lack of political and economic goods and services in spite of their significant contribution to the Nigerian and global economy.

Specifically, the poor human security (basic needs), lack of infrastructures, wanton ecological damages, theft and unjust distribution of revenue from the sale of oil, and the perceived apathy on the part of the government and the multinational oil companies contributed to what became known as the Niger Delta Crisis. With time, the conflict graduated to Low Intensity Conflict: a condition characterized by assassinations, bombings, kidnappings, and mutual destruction of interests.

To save face, and to patch a bleeding economy, the Nigerian government hesitantly acquiesced to the supplications of Governor Timipre Sylva of Bayelsa State, who had vigorously and persistently floated the idea of a general amnesty in order to ward off the equivalent retaliations. In the end, the amnesty process was not well-thought out. No one in government knew what was to take place before or after the amnesty announcement; and no one seem to know what comes next after the amnesty period. It was hurriedly announced and hurriedly executed with no clear goals or benchmarks.

What became apparent was that the amnesty agreement was dictated, and forced on particular sections of the militant and justice-seeking groups as not all the warring groups, and their high command, were amenable to the amnesty deal. In any case, the government was after one thing and one thing only: the suspension and/or the cessation of hostile actions against the government and the multinational oil companies.

What has also become apparent is that the amnesty package has no legal backing. As of this writing, no legislation has been signed into law legalizing the amnesty. It is therefore possible that future governments may annul or abridge whatever arrangements that were agreed to. The implication is that participants in the so-called amnesty may be subjected to legal and/or extra-legal sanctions. Essentially, this was a plan that was hurriedly put together, no post-amnesty plans were ever devised; no legal authorization ever made; and no peacebuilding measures envisaged.

Post-conflict environments are usually characterized by motions and ordered-disorder by governmental and non-governmental organizations and by members of the civil society -- all trying to put in place plans meant to discourage a repeat of the conflict, and encouraging policies meant to rebuild lives, the environment and infrastructures that were destroyed.

In other words, once hostilities ceases, several parties -- especially the government and its agents -- executes plans that are meant to rebuild confidence, rebuild the physical environment and rebuild lives. None of the aforementioned is evident in Nigeria, yet, the government and the national assembly celebrated the “successful completion” of the amnesty program. Therefore, one may conclude that:
A. This government, as with previous governments, has no concrete plans to solve the crisis. After all, for more than four decades, the ruling class and its agents have been benefiting from the inhumanity that have come to be associated with the region; or
B. This government is bidding its time until when she is able to attempt a “knockout blow” to justice-seeking groups like the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). That day may never come. Not since 1914 or 1960, has there ever been a group this formidable as to bleed the Nigerian economy and toy with its security apparatus.

In concurrence with Plan B, it is also possible that what we have is a prelude to a ground war: To teach the Ijaw ethnic nationality lessons they may soon not forget. The Ijaw Question, after all, has bedeviled the Nigerian State since and before the amalgamation.

Even assuming that the Nigerian government is not prejudiced or have ulterior motives against the Ijaw, the amnesty package, as is currently devised, is a charade. What we see are half-hearted attempts at peacebuilding. We see, for instance, that millions of dollars that should have gone towards reconstruction and infrastructural development is being used to bribe and silent powerful individuals within the region. We see that valuable resources are being expended towards survival strategies. We also see that select individual and their companies are profiting from the sale of armaments. Who profit most from the bunkering and from the anarchy?

Within the Niger Delta, and since the conclusion of the amnesty, three phenomenons have come to the fore. First, some Niger Deltans have been betraying their own people. Clothed in low-self esteem and duplicity, they have lost all moral right to speak for and on behalf of their people. What really matters, to them, is political and economic gains. It is possible that they were never really fighting and defending the cause, anyway. When they go before the Presidency, they mostly concern themselves with their individual needs and bank accounts.

Second, we also see the formation of several powerhouses within the region, all lobbying the Presidency for political profit. Some powerhouses have even formed alliances with powerhouses outside of the region in order to be placed near the top of the food chain. Others are portraying themselves to be true representative of the people and claiming to be the alpha and the omega -- without whom nothing tangible can be achieved. The question the younger generation is asking is this: “What have been their achievements the last forty years?”

Third, there is an irony -- an irony one first noticed some years back: The same people who incite youths to take up arms (as legitimate as arm taking against the Nigerian government is/was), never allowed their own children or grandchildren to join the struggle. For the most part, their children and some immediate family members can be found in Europe, the United State, South Africa and other stable and progressive countries. They send other people’s children to the battle field, yet, send their own children to safe places around the world for better education, better healthcare and clean air.

In the final analysis – especially with respect to the amnesty – it may blow up because there are no proper and genuine attempts at post-conflict reconstruction. There are no plans underway to tackle the cause of the agitation. What’s more, there are groups and individuals within and outside of the region who, because of the profit they derive, would rather see the conditions remain the same. Or, marginally improved. The politics of the Niger Delta is as complex and befuddling as the Nigerian politics and society. The Nigerian political landscape is a network of convoluted and muddy tributaries.